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Systems Analysis uses many disciplines and sophisticated
techniques to determine the relative effectiveness of alternate systems,
This relationship can then be reversed by an arbitrary choice of a dis-
count rate. In the private sector, the discount rate is determined by
the cost of capital. In the public sector, the cost of acquiring capi-
tal is not clearly defined. The following proposals for the interest
rate in the public sector are considered: (1) the government bond
rate; (2) the rate of growth of the national product; and (3) a rate
derived from the average rate of return in the private sector. It is
concluded that the interest rate in the public sector currently lies
between 4.75 and 10 percent.
The circumstances which generate uncertainty and the means of
handling this uncertainty are also discussed. A procedure is recom-
mended which modifies the difference between expected costs to make
them equally significant. Particular attention is focused on uncer-
tainty occasioned by changing technology and the probability of war.
It is concluded that a unique estimate of the risk component is inde-
terminate and that uncertainty should be considered in the context of
the specific systems under consideration.
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Systems analysis uses many disciplines and sophisticated
techniques, often at considerable expense, to determine the relative
effectiveness of alternate systems. The relationship so determined
can then be reversed by an arbitrary choice of a discount rate. Such
a situation arises when a proposed system, characterized by high
development costs and relatively low operating costs, is compared with
a system already developed but with higher operating costs. Assuming
equal effectiveness, the savings in reduced operating costs can be
thought of as an annuity purchased for an amount equal to the dif-
ference in initial costs. The decision rule is to accept the new
system if the annuity is greater than the interest premium sacrificed
by the additional investment. The criterion is clear. The problem is
to evaluate the interest premium sacrificed. In the private sector,
net returns are discounted using the cost of capital or the bank inter-
est rate. In the public sector, funds allocated by the annual budget
cannot be similarly invested to draw interest. Although there is no
interest rate in the public sector corresponding to the market rate
of interest, there is an opportunity cost for public investments. First,
there is the actual cost of acquiring capital and secondly, there may be
a difference in returns to the economy as a whole due to the transfer of
resources away from the private sector. The cost of acquiring capital
and the marginal rate of return on capital are not clearly defined for
the public sector. Consequently, the discount rate for a non-market
context has not yet been determined.
The discount rate is actually composed of two elements, a nor-
mative component and a risk component , The former reflects the oppor-
tunity cost of an investment under conditions of certainty. The latter
expresses the degree of uncertainty of investment outcomes. Future
costs and returns are stochastic elements whose variance must be con-
sidered. Some confusion exists in the literature when no distinction
is made between these components or when one is discussed without con-
sideration of the other. For example, some authors feel that the risk
component is indeterminate and therefore reject the entire concept of
a discount rate in the non-market context. There is also some confusion
as to the precise meaning of risk in such a context.
Most of the controversy surrounding the choice of an appropriate
discount rate can be focused at two poles corresponding to the normative
and risk components of the discount rate. There are a number of candi-
dates for the former component. Among these are: (1) the government
bond rate; (2) the rate of growth of the national product; and (3) a rate
derived from the average rate of return in the private sector. There are
also several schools of thought regarding the handling of risk. Some
feel that a risk component should be included in the discount rate.
Others feel that uncertainty should be dealt with explicitly at the
level where costs are estimated. Finally, there are those who contend
that the government should not worry about risk aversion at all. Chapter
II addresses the problem of opportunity costs (normative rate) and Chap-
ter III deals with the question of uncertainty (risk component) . Chapter
IV summarizes the results and discusses the collective treatment of the





One concept of a discount rate is that it reduces a cost
stream, that 1s, a vector of costs incurred over several time periods,
to a scalar quantity in a single time frame. The discount rate, under
conditions of certainty, equates each future cost in year t to an
equivalent present value. It is based on an interest rate i which
is the premium for deferring present consumption (not undertaking
the investment) and is expressed as (1 + i) _t . How do we evaluate
this interest rate in a non-market context? Is it unique? If not,
how do we estimate it? Even the market rate of interest is not
unique. There are different interest rates for time deposits,
personal loans, consumer credit, mutual funds, stocks, and bonds.
In a very general sense, the interest rate is the cost of capital.
One estimate of the cost of capital in the public sector is the
government bond rate.
Another interpretation of the interest rate is that of op-
portunity cost. The underlying assumption is that, for any invest-
ment project, an alternate use of capital always exists. This alter-
nate use of capital is the opportunity cost of the investment. One
such alternative is the loaning of capital at the going interest rate.
This interpretation is not suitable for the public sector because
public funds cannot be loaned for this purpose. Another alternate use
of capital might be a second investment project with different cost
and benefit streams. In this sense, the discount rate is a criterion
for allocating resources to one investment rather than to another.
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This concept can be extended to the non-market context. In other
words, the discount rate for public investment may be considered as
the criterion for transferring resources between the private and
public sectors. Public investments utilize resources which could
have been used by the private sector. The marginal rate of return
in the private sector may be considered as the opportunity cost of
a public investment. The exact discount rate to be used depends on
the relative efficiency of capital in both sectors. The basic deci-
sion rule for determining the allocation of resources between alter-
nate investment opportunities is that the marginal return tn each
must be equal. Accordingly, one proposal for the discount rate in
the public sector is the marginal rate of return in the private
sector.
Government purchase of goods and services are included in
the computation of the GNP as are private expenditures. On the sur-
face it would appear that an increase in government spending and a
corresponding decrease in private spending produces the same effect
on the economy. The total value of the GNP remains the same. However,
the GNP is only an accounting device. It is descriptive rather than
normative in that it tells how resources were used, not how they
should have been used. The government may be hiring men to dig holes
and to fill them in again in which case the GNP is an inflated repre-
sentation of the true productivity of the economy. It may be assumed
that the government is not engaged in aimless practices but is procuring
1. William Baumol , Statement , U,S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Hearings before Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 90th Congress,
1st Session on September 14, 19, 20, and 21, 1967 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 153.
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and operating useful end items. Assuming further that a weapon
system, purchased by the government, will yield the same level of
utility as that achieved by a private expenditure of a similar
amount of funds, future economic growth must still be considered.
One weapon system will not produce another weapon system but part
of the output in the private sector, which is curtailed by govern-
ment expenditures, will be capital goods, Since these capital goods
could have been used to create new growth, there is also an oppor-
tunity cost in deferred growth for most government purchases.
If a billion dollars worth of capital investment is curtailed
this year, the opportunity cost is one billion dollars,. If, however,
the government expenditures are deferred until next year, the billion
dollars could have been invested to yield a net return of x percent.
This additional amount is still available after the government expendi-
tures in the second year. Moreover, the net return continues to yield
returns on itself in perpetuity, The opportunity cost is now one bil-
lion less these additional returns. Therefore, the two opportunity
costs cannot be viewed as equal and the deferred cost stream must be
discounted.
The investments of each government agency presumably are
attempts to maximize national objectives, However, each individual
agency may be suboptimizing with respect to its own objective func-
tions. If there is no constraint placed upon the maximization of
these individual objective functions, the national objectives may
not be maximized at all. For example, excessive investment by the
Department of Defense may have a retarding effect on the rate of
economic growth. It may be wiser to defer some of these investments
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until they can be better afforded. For this reason, the rate of growth
of the national product was proposed as an estimate of the interest
rate. This estimate may be regarded as a constraint to insure con-
formity with a primary national objective.
These three estimates of the interest rate, the bond rate, the
rate of return in the private sector, and the rate of growth of the
national product, were advanced for the following reasons.
(1) Resources are not free and there is a cost of acquiring
capital.
(2) Public investments take resources away from the private
sector.
(3) Curtailment of capital investment may deter future
economic growth.
(4) With a rising GNP, deferred costs are borne more easily.
(5) Public investments should be constrained 'to insure
conformity with national objectives.
All of these arguments imply that allowance for the opportunity cost
of an investment should be made by discounting with some positive
interest rate.
The bond rate
One estimate of the cost of capital in the public sector ts
2
the rate at which the government can borrow funds. The government
could alternatively refrain from borrowing and either pay off the
national debt or lower taxes. It does borrow because it feels that
the return on its investment at least equals the rate at which it is
borrowing. In other words, the bond rate, currently evaluated at
2. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harvard University Press, T§63)
, p. 210,
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4.75 percent, is the cost of capital. A counterargument is that the
government does not borrow because it must but only to curtail present
consumption. Proponents of this argument contend that the government
has alternate ways of raising money such as taxation and printing
money. Taxation is a direct means of transferring money from the
private to the public sector. After taxes, the individual has less
money with which to buy private consumption goods . These goods, or
the resources to produce these goods, are now released for government
use. Fiat money is another alternative, Merely by printing a suf-
ficient quantity of new money, the government can bid the necessary
resources away from the private sector* In the long run prices will
rise until real income is the same as it would have been with taxation.
Borrowing is the final alternative. The government can either sell
bonds to banks and in effect create new money or it can sell to indi-
viduals. In the latter case, private consumption is voluntarily
reduced by approximately the same amount as it would have been by
taxation. Although individuals can now earn an additional income
with interest premiums, prices will be bid upward as they were with
fiat money and real income will again remain unchangedo In summary
the government could finance its expenditures by printing money or
by taxation with no clear indication of the interest rate. On the
other hand, the government could raise all of its money by borrowing
and the bond rate could be considered an estimate of capital cost.
That the government must borrow is not a critical assumption to the
use of the bond rate of interest,
Baumol has stated that the bond rate of interest is at least
a lower limit on the estimate of the opportunity cost of resources used
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by the public sector. He states that there are two alternate uses
for these resources . They could be left in the hands of business
firms or they could be left with individual consumers. In the former
case he contends, and feels that most economists would agree, that
these resources would yield a return easily above the bond rate of
interest. To estimate the marginal return on consumer expenditures,
he uses an interesting argument:
For a consumer it is not quite so clear what the opportunity
cost represents, because there is no discernible earning on
resources utilized by a consumer for his own purposes. And
yet one can find out what those earnings are by indirection.
If a consumer chooses to invest some portion of his funds in
Government securities, it is clear that the rate of return
he gets for those funds for his own purposes must approximate
the rate of return which the Government securities yield to
him. Because if the rate of return from his own consumption
were lower than what he can get for Government securities,
clearly it would pay him to take even more of his money than
he does and turn it into Government securities.
3
This imputed rate of return assumes that consumers are opti-
mizing in their behavior. Other actions by consumers show that this
is not always the case. For example, the excessive rate of interest
paid for installment credit certainly indicates otherwise. The low
rate of return on insurance policies could also be cited as the mar-
ginal rate of return t>f consumer expenditures by the same argument.
However, a distinction should be made between voluntary and constrained
investments. Some consumers utilize credit because of an inability to
save voluntarily. Others are simply unaware of implicit interest rates.
An insurance policy represents the need to build an immediate estate
without limiting present consumption too rigorously. The government
should be regarded as a sophisticated consumer with financial
3. Baumol , 0£, cit . , p. 151.
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flexibility. In this sense, only voluntary consumer investments
should be considered. There are other commercial rates of interest
in this category. Among these are the rates paid by banks, credit
unions, mutual funds and there are the average yields of stocks and
corporate bonds. These interest rates are all higher than the govern-
ment bond rate. The returns to business firms as pointed out by
Baumol are also above the government bond rate. Therefore, this rate
is accepted tentatively as a lower limit on the interest rate in the
public sector.
Growth rate of the national product
An estimate for opportunity cost that goes below the bond rate
4
is the rate of growth of the national product. The essential argument
is that the national product will increase over time. Therefore, the
resources used this year are more valuable than those resources returned
on the investment in future years* The latter are less valuable not
because of a time preference but simply because they are part of a
larger national product. Implicit in this argument is the concept
that a decreasing marginal utility is proportional to increases in
the national product. There is some intuitive appeal in this argument.
Assuming a diminishing marginal efficiency of capital, the rate of
growth of the national product is a decreasing function of the total
level of investment. This level of investment also reflects the
utility function of the society as a whole, The use of the growth
rate as the interest rate will certainly determine the level of invest-
ment. If this rate is high, it will restrict public investments and
4. E. B, Berman, "The Normative Interest Rate," RAND Publication
P-1796 (Santa Monice: The RAND Corporation, 1959), p. 22.
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release more resources to the private sector; if it is low, it will
generate an opposite effect. However, there is nothing to preclude
an accelerating effect in one direction only, A low rate of growth
would permit even more public investment and conceivably less capital
investment. The result would be a lower rate of growth for the future.
A non-optimal rate of growth should not be the basis of its own
perpetuity and there is no guarantee that the current rate is in fact
optimal. The relative efficiency of capital in the private and public
sectors should be considered and an interest rate which permits the
most efficient allocation of resources in both sectors should be
chosen. For these reasons, the rate of growth of the national product
will be rejected as an appropriate interest rate.
The rate of return in the private sector
Stockfisch advocates that the government interest rate be equal
to the rate of return on investment in the private sector of the
5
economy. As stated previously, optimal ity will prevail when the
marginal rate of return in the private sector equals the marginal rate
of return in the public sector, There are, however, two problems with
which to contend. First, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to measure in dollar terms the returns to most public investments.
How, for example, can the effectiveness of a weapon system, the returns
on manpower retraining, or the benefits of a space probe be evaluated
in commensurable units? Secondly, the marginal rate of return in the
private sector cannot be measured accurately because of present
5. J. A, Stockfisch, "The Interest Cost of Holding Military Inventory,"




accounting practices. Many firms invest In several different projects
with varying rates of return, and only the average of these returns
are reported for tax purposes. Theoretically, each firm would first
invest in that project yielding the highest marginal return and invest
successively in those projects with monotonically decreasing rates of
return. The final rate of return realized for each firm should be
equal to that of every other firm.
The ability to equate marginal returns implies a perfect
mobility of capital. Even with this assumption, future returns are
not deterministic. Many investments are based on incomplete knowledge,
some yielding negative returns. The best that can be done at present
is to arrive at an average rate of return for each firm by summing
over all its investments and then to find the average of these rates
by summing over all firms. Stockfisch has done this for 72 major
corporations and determined empirically that the average rate of
return was 16.5 percent. (Hirshleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman made
a similar study for utilities and arrived at a figure of 10 percent. )
Since there are rates of return above the average, the marginal rate
of return is something less than this figure* It could conceivably
be zero. However, if this were the case, firms would not borrow at
the bank interest rate and even internal financing would be decreased
to take advantage of the bank or bond interest rates . The point is
that 16.5 percent is a maximum estimate for the interest rate and must
be revised downward, Stockfisch himself has lowered his estimate to
6. Ibid ., p. 14.
7. J. Hirshleifer, J. C. DeHaven, and J. W. Milliman, Water Supply :
Economics , Technology and Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960), pp. l40-T48\
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the neighborhood of 10 to 15 percent Baumol and Kami en also agree
8
that this estimate should be closer to «0 percent.
Although a precise estimate of the interest rate for the
public sector appears to be impossible, upper and lower bounds have
been placed on it. The rate of growth of the national product was
rejected primarily because it did not distinguish between the private
and public sectors and could not insure the optimal allocation of
resources between these two sectors. The government bond rate of
4 75 percent was considered an acceptable estimate of the cost of
capital in the public sector and this was the lowest estimate of the
interest rate considered. An estimate of the marginal rate of return
in the private sector, derived from an average rate of return, was
also accepted as an indication of the opportunity cost of public
investments. Although 15 percent is the maximum estimate, there
appears to be more confidence in a figure of 10 percent as the maxi-
mum estimate, This upper limit could be refined by more precise
reporting of business data, (A model for relating the average rate
of return in the private sector to that in the public sector is
presented in Appendix A.) Between the two limits of our estimate
there is a spectrum of interest rates found within the private sector,
These rates, however, reflect the cost of capital in the private sec-
tor based on varying degrees of risk If we average the estimates of
4.75 and 10 percent, a figure of 7 or 8 percent seems appropriate.
This is an arbitrary choice but one which minimizes the deviation
from either estimate Since public investments are often evaluated
in comparison with other proposed investments, a sensitivity analysis,
as outlined in Appendix B, over the range of the proposed interest
rates may preclude the necessity for a precise estimate.
8. Baumol, op_ cvt




Risk or uncertainty exists because of the stochastic nature
of investments. In decision theory, risk is characterized by a known
state space and a known probability distribution for the occurence of
each state. In the case of uncertainty, the probability distribution
is unknown. The two terms are used here interchangeably and they both
denote the possibility of incurring cost streams greater or less than
those estimated. This definition does not imply that future benefits
or returns are deterministic. They are treated as such in the non-
market context because of the measurability problem. Any evaluation
of effectiveness in absolute terms is an approximation and greater
accuracy will not be achieved by further manipulation. Uncertainty,
then, will refer to variation in cost estimates from the actual costs
incurred.
Factors generating uncertainty
There are numerous circumstances which contribute to uncer-
tainty. One of the most sifnificant is changing technology. Advanced
systems not only react to changes in technology but they also initiate
them. This fact raises the specter of a technological barrier. Cost
estimates may be predicated on the assumption of routine production
when in fact critical design problems remain unsolved. Quite often
this entails a reduction in the level of effectiveness necessitating
a higher force level with associated higher costs. On the other hand,
a technological breakthrough offers the promise of greater effective-
ness which may or may not reduce costs. Specification changes of a
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cost increasing nature may be tne option selected rather than a reduc-
tion in costs . Operating costs are usually based on some finite time
period (Costs occurring beyond this period may be thought of as
discounted at an infinite rate ) Changing technology may give rise
to early obsolescence and a truncation of the expected time frame
Thus some costs may never be incurred. Conversely, delayed obsoles-
cence, or the failure to program for a replacement system, will
extend the time horizon and the period over which costs are incurred.
Uncertainty is also generated by enemy actions An increase
in his force level may cause a revision of our force level. Similarly
his introduction of an advanced system may signal the premature obso-
lescence of one of our systems. The initiation of war is an extreme
case of enemy action which affects a system in two ways. First, the
return on a weapon system may be considered as being higher in the
event of war„ Secondly, this system will be consumed, earlier with
a sudden suspension of operating costs This is equivalent to a
high discount rate, Generally speaking, then, systems costs should
be more heavily discounted, to make them more acceptable, when the
probability of war is high
All of the above considerations may be loosely grouped into
a category known as requirements uncertainty Fisher has concluded
on the basis of empirical studies that this type of uncertainty causes
1
the greatest variation in costs - sometimes by a factor of two/ Another
source of uncertainty is that engendered by errors in basic data or by
differences in cost-estimating techniques
1. G H. Fisher, "The Problem of Uncertainty," RAND Publication
RM-3589-PR (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, June, 1963), p VI -2.
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Means of handling uncertainty
In a market context, allowance is made for uncertainty by
adding a risk component to the discount rate, If the difference
between returns and costs is positive, discounting will reduce the
present value of this difference and make the investment less ac-
ceptable. In this case the returns, being higher, will be reduced
more heavily than the costs. This would balance the actual occur-
rence of an increase in costSc A decrease in costs would simply be
a bonus. A conceptual problem exists if the difference is negative.
Reducing a negative difference will make the investment more acceptable,
Therefore, the higher the discount rate, the more likely will a risky
investment be undertaken. This is contrary to the intent of adding a
risk component. However, the problem is not likely to occur in the
private sector because any investment with a negative present value
will not be undertaken. In the non-market context the advantage of
this decision rule override does not exist, Benefits can rarely be
evaluated and so only costs are discounted. As was discussed in
Chapter II, costs may be discounted alone to reflect opportunity cost
but it is not clear that they should be similarly discounted to account
for risk. Risk discounting in a non-market context is a little more
subtle than discounting a net return to hedge against increased costs.
Moreover, discounting the expected cost streams cannot give us a more
accurate estimate of future costs . The reason is that these costs may
be greater or less than those estimated, If actual costs prove to be
less than the expected value, a positive risk component would be
required. If, however, actual costs exceed the expected value, a
negative component would be required. The only way to determine
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which is appropriate is to know the actual costs beforehand. On this
basis, some authors feel that the solution is indeterminate and recom-
mend that no discounting be made for risk. (They are actually recom-
mending zero as the best estimate of the risk component.) They further
contend that uncertainty should be handled by those who actually con-
duct the cost analysis by using modern statistical methods or Monte
Carlo techniques. This is only a partial solution. To understand




Linear regression analysis is a routine means of determining
a cost estimating function and the variance associated with it. The
unknown variable cost, denoted by Y, is expressed as a function of
some independent variable X (speed, payload, range, etc.). The
resulting relationship is of the form:
Y = 3 +3 X,
An estimate of this relationship is of the form:
Y = a + b X, 3.1
Using the method of least squares, the sum of the squared deviations
of the sample observations is minimized That is,
ii
21 (Y. - a - b L) z s a minimum.
Taking the partials with respect to a and b and setting them equal to
2. G. H. Fisher, "Use of Statistical Regression Analysis in Deriving
Estimating Relationships," RAND Publication RM-3589-PR (Santa Monica:
The RAND Corporation, June, 1963"5TCh~apter V.
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zero, we obtain the normal equations:
n n
X Y. = na + b 21 X
i
n n n
and S X.Y. = a2x. + bSx. 2 .
j=l J J 3-1 J j-l J
These equations are solved for a and b to obtain the parameters of
the estimating function 3.1. To determine how good an estimate has





7 n - 2
where Y. is an actual observed value of the sample and Y is the
J P
predicted value obtained by using 3,1. Two degrees of freedom are
lost because of the two parameters, a and b, already estimated.
However, the analyst is more concerned with predicting future costs
in a population which his sample represents not in the variance of
his sample. He will usually construct a confidence interval by
adding to and subtracting from his estimate the following value:





where t 1_a / 2 = the value from the t-distribution cor-
responding to the significance level a.
and X = the value of the independent variable
which will determine the future cost.
The above assumes that for a given X, the Y's are normally distributed
about a mean Y = 3 +3 X .
o 1
For fixed X, the length of this confidence interval will
increase as costs are projected further into the future and values of
X* are further removed from X As depicted in Figure 1, the uncertainty
increases over time. As the confidence intervals for two alternate
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systems' costs begin to overlap, we become more uncertain as to which
system will have the lower cost.
COST
YEARS
ESTIMATE OF COSTS OVER TIME
FIGURE 1
In year 1, any cost estimate for System A within its confidence
interval is greater than any estimate contained within the interval
for System B. In year 2, however, System B may have a cost (point B)
higher than that of System A (point A).
We may proceed with our assumption that the cost estimates
are normally distributed over the respective regression lines. The
situation in the first year may now be depicted as in Figure 2a and





COSTc COST c t
ASSUMED PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR COSTS
FIGURE 2
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As a specific example assume that the estimating functions
for System A and System B were determined from samples of size 20 and
10 respectively and the confidence intervals for each in the two years
are as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
SYSTEMS COSTS IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
SYSTEM A B A B
UPPER LIMIT 8 7 5 8 1 14 2 18 2
EXPECTED VALUE 7 5 7 10 115
LOWER LIMIT 6 2 5 5 9 58 4 8
YEAR 1 2
In the first year the expected cost of System A is 50 million more
than System B but in the second year, it is 150 million less. In
other words, the difference between the expected costs in the second
year is of greater magnitude than that for the first year but there
is considerably more uncertainty about the former. How, then, does
an analyst treat the two differences to determine which system has
the lower total expected costs? Clearly he does not want to treat
the cost differences equally. He wants to reduce the impact of the
cost difference which is more uncertain. This is the intent of dis-
counting for risk, not manipulation of the costs to make them more
accurate relatively. The crux of the problem is to make the difference
between the expected values equally significant. Statistical theory
does not provide us with any means of accomplishing this. The problem
is that the future expected costs Y , and Y are actually random varia-
1 2




DISTRIBUTION OVER THE REGRESSION LINE
FIGURE 3
For given X, no probability distribution can be established about the
random variable Y. The only meaningful distribution is about the popu-
lation mean Y. Moreover, the changing length of the confidence interval
Y + S' does not imply a changing population. The variance of the true
population remains the same. This is an underlying assumption of the
regression model. Although the confidence intervals for the expected
costs of the two systems overlap, we cannot perform any hypothesis
tests for the difference of Y. - Y_. Any attempt to compute a
numerical value for the risk component is arbitrary and a departure
from statistical theory.
Nevertheless, we are still faced with a decision-making prob-
lem. Institutionally, linear regression models are not the sole source
of cost estimates. One cost estimating approach may be used to estimate
procurement costs while others are used to estimate various operating
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costs. Therefore, the homoscedasticity assumption 1s tenuous and
should be dropped. The variances of the cost estimates for System A
and System B appear to change over time as shown in Figure 4.
ASSUMED DISTRIBUTION OF COST ESTIMATES
FIGURE 4
We will proceed in an ad hoc manner and assume that the variance is
equal to S =
I2
S'/t, ,„ . For our example S A = 60 and S„ = 50 for thel-a/2 r A B
first year and S = 200 and S = 300 for the second year.
In hypothesis testing we usually select a significance level a
and determine if there is any significant difference between two sample
means. In this case, we will assume that the difference in expected
costs for any year is significant and determine the level of signifi-





and compare it with


















The lowest value of a for which t 1 > t will be the significance level.
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_T60> (50)^60J_2 0FV2 _ ..
~W ~T0~J " 2 * 415
/2.191 at a = o05
.3.087 .01
Therefore, the first year cost estimates are significantly different






t . .[ii~ii + i300l£] - . ,.428 .
t
fc.231 at a = .05
ll.338 .20
The second year cost estimates are significantly different at the .20
level. These significance levels are represented by the shaded areas
shown in Figure 4.
In order to treat the differences in cost estimates with the
same degree of uncertainty we would like the significance level for
the second year to equal that of the first year. Although there are
no means of actually accomplishing this, there are reduced variances
and
u t' = 64where
such that the significance level for the second year would be .05. By








7 7 ? . 2















.64(150) f 96 .





r = (.64)"^ - 1 = .25 .
Thus, for the example given, the risk component of the discount rate
is approximately 25 percent. This appears to be a rather high rate
but the example reflected an extreme case which was characterized by
large variances and in which differences in expected values changed
radically.
One point that should be emphasized is the fact that there is
no unique value for the risk component as there is for the normative
component. The former is a function of the degree of uncertainty sur-
rounding a particular set of cost estimates. Some estimates, such
as those dealing with advanced or complicated systems, will have
considerable uncertainty surrounding them and the risk component will
be relatively high. Estimates of other types of equipment such as
vehicles or individual weapons will reflect much less uncertainty,
particularly if more historical data is available for making these
estimates (the sample sizes are larger),. For routine items of equip-
ment, the change in the confidence intervals will be smaller and the
levels at which expected costs are significantly different will be
more nearly equal. Therefore, the risk component will be correspond-
ingly smaller. Since the risk component is a variable whereas a
unique estimate has been obtained for the normative component, the
two should be used separately rather than combined into one rate when
discounting costs.
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In the model presented, the use of a single independent variable
in equation 3.1 would only reflect the uncertainty caused by the sample
size or by errors in basic data. It has been stated previously that
changing technology and changes in specifications cause much of the
uncertainty regarding systems' costs. It would be extremely difficult,
even in retrospect, to determine how much of the difference between
the estimated cost and the actual cost was due to these factors.
However, a simple way of accounting for these factors is to add time
as another independent variable. Presumably with a longer develop-
ment period, changes in technology would exert a greater impact and
there would be more specification changes. Our estimating function
becomes
Y = a + bX + cT.
There are some changes in that we now have three normal equations to
solve for the parameters a, b, and c and we lose three degrees of
freedom in estimating these parameters. The equations for computing
confidence intervals are also modified but the rest of the model
remains the same.
Uncertainty due to the probability of war cannot be similarly
incorporated into the model because the historical data used in deter-
mining the estimating function would not account for the probability
of war. Any method of allowing for this probability appears to be
arbitrary. Nevertheless, one straightforward means of doing so is
to consider the probability of actually incurring the estimated costs
for each year. Assuming the probability of war in each year is .10,
the expected total cost





The risk discount rate in this case is the cumulative probability of
war not occurring. This rather simple model is only a first approxima-
tion and is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. For a more
rigorous treatment, the following factors should be considered. First,
the probability of war in year t is higher if war has occurred in year
t-1 since wars usually continue beyond one year. This suggests that a
Markov model would be more appropriate. Secondly, the conditional
probability of a system being destroyed, given that war has occurred,
is a function of the intensity and duration of the war. The estima-
tion of these probabilities is not as hopeless as it may appear. Many
strategic systems, such as the Minuteman or Polaris, will be used only
in the event of a general war and the probability of this occurring is
presumably small. In other words, we can ignore the probability of an
insurgency or limited war when talking about such systems. Furthermore,
the number of these systems to be employed can be specified in contin-
gency plans. Conversely, other systems, such as tactical aircraft,
will be employed over the whole spectrum of war, giving us a high
probability of commitment. There is also empirical evidence to sug-
gest that aircraft attrition rates will be kept within rather narrow
limits. High attrition rates in a particular sector may cause the
curtailment of air operations in this sector. The implication is that
the destruction of a particular system is not a completely uncontrolled
variable and the probability of destruction can be narrowly defined.
In view of the above, a general model for treating the probability of
war would be arbitrary and hedged with numerous assumptions. The use
of models associated with specific systems, and based on empirical data,
is therefore recommended.
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The procedure for determining the total risk component may be
summarized as follows. Select a suitable cost estimation model which
includes changing technology or time as an independent variable.
Although a linear regression model was used for illustration, curvi-
linear regression models, Monte Carlo simulations, or PERT may be
more appropriate. Using this model, determine the expected cost of
each system for each year and compute the associated confidence inter-
vals. Determine, also, the significance level for the cost difference
in the first year (or arbitrarily select a significance level) and find
the constant c which would change the probability distributions such
that all cost differences are equally significant. Multiply the
expected costs by this constant. The probability of war should be
treated separately and in the context of the specific systems under
consideration. Although the discounted estimates will presumably be
less than actual costs, and therefore appear to be less accurate when
viewed in an absolute sense, the relationship between two different
estimates will be more meaningful. The difference between cost streams
becomes smaller the more heavily we discount in the same sense as the




Resources are not free. There is either an explicit cost of
acquiring them or an opportunity cost of sacrificing alternate uses
of them. In the public sect( r the real cost of acquiring capital is
not as clearly defined as it is in the private sector. The different
options of financing public investments obscure the cost of capital.
One estimate of this cost was shown to be the government bond rate
of 4.75 percent. Most public investments pre-empt resources in the
private sector causing curtailment of capital investment and deferred
growth. The marginal rate of return in the private sector may be
considered as the opportunity cost of public investments. Accordingly,
the marginal rate of return in the private sector was also proposed
as an estimate of the interest rate. This is intuitively appealing
since the marginal return in both sectors should be equal for an
efficient allocation of resources between both sectors. Furthermore,
the marginal return should equal the marginal cost of an investment
project. Because of the difficulty in measuring the marginal rate of
return in the private sector, an estimate had to be derived from the
average rate of return. The average rate was determined empirically
to be 16.5 percent. A maximum estimate of the marginal rate in the
neighborhood of 10 percent appears reasonable. It was concluded that
the interest rate in the public sector lies between 4,75 and 10 percent.
Sensitivity analysis over this range will be sufficient to evaluate
many public investments. If a more precise estimate of the Interest
rate is needed, an average of the two estimates, 7 or 8 percent, is
recommended.
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The interest rate is not the only factor to be considered in
determining the discount rate. Because of the stochastic properties
of investments a risk factor must also be considered. This risk
factor is not unique due to the different degrees of risk associated
with various types of investments. Discounting for risk in the private
sector has the effect of reducing a net return to allow for increased
costs or smaller returns* In the public sector returns are rarely
measured and so only costs can be discounted. It would appear that
discounting costs alone would make all investments more acceptable,
a concept which is contrary to the intent of discounting for risk.
Actually, it is the variance in cost estimates which we would like to
reduce, not simply the costs themselves . The difference between the
expected costs of two alternate investments changes over time and
becomes more uncertain. We would like to treat the cost difference
in each time frame with equal significance* In hypothesis testing,
a significance level is chosen and the difference between two ex-
pected values is considered significant or not significant at the
level chosen.. A reverse procedure was recommended whereby the dif-
ference in each time frame was considered significant and the level
of significance was determined. The cost streams could then be mul-
tiplied by a derived vector to make the differences in expected costs
equally significant. The elements of this vector may be interpreted
as the risk discount rates for each time frame,
Technological change may be treated endogenously by including
time as an independent variable in the cost estimating model. The
probability of war, however, should be treated separately. Once the
cost stream has been discounted for opportunity costs and then for
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risk, it should be multiplied by the complementary probabilities for
each time period, The sum of these terms will yield the expected value
of the cost stream in today "s dollars, In summary, there is no unique
discount rate. Each investment must be considered in relation to its
alternate. For a least cost criterion, the cost stream with the
lowest expected value will determine the preferred investment.
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APPENDIX A
AVERAGE RATES OF RETURN IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS
A question that might be raised is: Can a relationship be
inferred between the average rate of return for the private sector
and that of the public sector? It is not proposed that average rates
of return be equated . If there is a choice between two investment
opportunities which are not mutually exclusive and which reflect
different internal rates of return, investment will be made in each
to the extent that their marginal returns will be equal. It is
axiomatic that the average rates will be different. Nevertheless,
if a relationship between the average rates of return in each sector
can be ascertained, then the upper bound for the marginal rate in the
private sector can be mapped into one for the public sector. To
illustrate how this might be accomplished, the following model is
presented. It is not offered as a rigorous proof of any specific
relationship; it is more of a heuristic approach to show that such
a relationship exists,
Assumptions
1) Each sector will expend part of its budget for present
consumption and invest the remainder for returns in a
future time period,
2) No qualitative distinction is made between consumption
in either sector or between the returns realized by
either sector,
3) The marginal efficiency of capital is monetonically
decreasing for each sector, Therefore, the investment
opportunity curved which translates present resources
into future returns is concave to the origin. (See
Figure 1
„)
1, Suggested by Jack Hirshleifer, "An Isoquant Approach to Investment
Decision Problems," RAND Publication P- 1158 (August 23, 1957), p. 5.
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4) Two cases are likely
a) The marginal efficiency of capital is the same for
both sectors.
b) The marginal efficiency of capital is different for
each sector.,
Notation
K = the GNP.
K = the total budget for the government sector.
K-K = the total budget for the private sector
.
P = the percent of the government budget spent on investment.
I = K p„ = the total government investment.
r = the average rate of return for I .
p = the percent of the private budget spent on investment.
I = ( K_K )p D
= the total private investment.
r = the average rate of return for I .
P P
C = (1-p )K current government consumption.
C = (1-p )(K-K ) = current private consumption,
p P g
V = the sum of future returns and present consumption for
both sectors
.
The objective function will be the maximization of present
consumption and future returns for both sectors,












= (1 + r
g










+ (1- Pp )(K-K
g
) .
= rKn pn + rn (K-K)pn + K.
g g g p g p
The above function is unconstrained in that V can be made larger by
taking larger values of r and r . However, assumption 3 states that
as K p gets larger, r gets smaller with a similar trade-off between





1n terms of K p and r 1n terms of (K-K )p n . A curve, as shown 1n
g g p g p
Figure 1, which closely approximates a true investment opportunity
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A new function may be formed using the two constraints and two Lagrange
multipliers. This function has seven unknown variables. To maximize
this function, the partial derivatives with respect to each of the
unknown variables will be taken and set equal to zero. The result is
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Substituting in Equation A.l,





































Using Equations A. 4 and A. 6, r = -z - r -> r = t- .








Thus for the case where the investment opportunity curves are identical,
r = r for a maximum. This is not a surprising result since the
9 P
average returns will be equal if the marginal returns are equal for
identical investment schedules. However, if some exogenous constraint
prevents the investment functions, p and p from being equal and
y r
causing a displacement away from the optimal point, the next best posi-
tion which still satisfies Equation A.8 will not have the average
returns equal. This, too, is not a surprising result since the marginal
rates will no longer be equal. Nevertheless, the relationship between
the average rates of return in the two sectors has been established by
assuming a particular function for the investment opportunity curve.
One interesting aspect is that r is relatively insensitive to large






























For the case where the marginal efficiency of capital is higher
for the public sector, the following function was used for r :
•yv.-lf-^l
Regaining the original function for r , Equation A. 8 becomes
p
g
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This satisfies our intuition to the extent that a more efficient invest-
ment schedule should reflect a higher average rate of return. Using
the same assumptions as in the preceding case, r varies between .2492
and .2495 for a change in p from ,5 to 1.0.
For the case where the marginal efficiency of capital is lower
for the public sector, the following function was used for r :






Optimal r is .10 and is still insensitive to a large change in p .
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It has been shown that by assuming a particular family of
functions for the marginal efficiency of capital, the average rate of
return for the public sector can be inferred from an empirical return
found in the private sector. It is this figure then that would be




Two methods for evaluating alternative investment projects are
the present value formulation and the internal rate of return rule.
The former uses the cost of capital or the interest rate to discount
future streams.
Letting P = the net present value,
R. = the return in time period t,
C
t
= the cost in time period t,
i = the interest rate, and
T = the lifetime of the project,
T
t
then P = 2 (Rt - C.)(l + i) \ (1)
t=0
z z
The project with the higher present value would be chosen assuming both
projects are mutually exclusive. In a non-market context, however, we
are uncertain as to the true value of i and hence the present value is
indeterminate. The second investment criterion, however, considers the
discount rate as an unknown variable and attempts to determine the dis-
count rate which will equate the present value of future returns with
that of the associated cost stream. This is the definition of the
internal rate of return.








The procedure for solving this polynomial in r is essentially
a trial and error process. If the initial estimate of r makes the
left hand side of Equation 2 positive, then a higher value of r should
be tried; if the result is negative, then a lower value is used. This
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procedure is iterated until Equation 2 is satisfied. The Investment
project with the higher rate of return, however, 1s not necessarily
the preferred one. If we plot the value of the left hand side of
Equation 2 against increasing values of r, we will obtain a decreasing





-C Mi + r ) -t
PRESENT VALUE VS. INTEREST RATES
FIGURE 1
Since the functions become zero at r A and r , these are the InternalA B
rates of return for the two projects, r is the discount rate which
makes the net returns for the two projects equivalent. In the
hypothetical situation depicted, project B has the higher rate of
return and would appear to be the preferred investment. Note that
the functions which have been plotted are also the present value
functions if r equals i. Note also that if i is less than r*, then
under the present value rule, Project A would be preferred. In other
words, it is only when i is greater than r* that the internal rate
of return yields the same result as the present value rule. We can
use this information in making a sensitivity analysis.
For example, let us suppose that we are presented with two
weapon systems of equal effectiveness and with cost streams as








SYSTEM A 500 MILLION 50 MILLION
SYSTEM B 280 100
*5 year expected life span
The discount rate which make these two cost streams equivalent is ap-
proximately 4.5 percent. If we are confident that the true discount
rate is greater than this figure, then System B is the preferred
system. Thus, in this example, we did not have to know the precise
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can then be reversed
sector, the discount
sector, the cost of
proposals for the in
government bond rate
a rate derived from
concluded that the i
4.75 and 10 percent.
is uses many disciplines and sophisticated techniques to
ve effectiveness of alternate systems. This relationship
by an arbitrary choice of a discount rate. In the private
rate is determined by the cost of capital. In the public
acquiring capital is not clearly defined. The following
terest rate in the public sector are considered: (1) the
(2) the rate of growth of the national product; and (3)
the average rate of return in the private sector. It is
nterest rate in the public sector currently lies between
The circumstances which generate uncertainty and the means of handling
this uncertainty are also discussed. A procedure is recommended which modifies
the difference between expected costs to make them equally significant. Particu-
lar attention is focused on uncertainty occasioned by changing technology and
the probability of war. It is concluded that a unique estimate of the risk
component is indeterminate and that uncertainty should be considered in the
context of the specific systems under consideration.
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